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Abstract 
Interpretation biases, in which ambiguous information is interpreted negatively, have 
been hypothesised to place adolescent females at greater risk of developing anxiety 
and mood disorders than same-aged males. We tested the hypothesis that adolescent 
girls interpret ambiguous scenarios more negatively, and/or less positively, than same-
aged males using the Adolescent Interpretation and Belief Questionnaire (N=67, 11-15 
years old). We also tested whether adolescent girls and boys differed in judging 
positive or negative interpretations to be more believable and whether the scenario 
content (social versus non-social) affected any sex difference in interpretation bias. 
The results showed that girls had higher average negative interpretation scores than 
boys, with no sex differences in positive interpretation scores. Girls and boys did not 
differ on which interpretation they found to be most believable. Both sexes reported 
that positive interpretations were less likely to come to mind, and were less believable, 
for social than for non-social scenarios. These results provide preliminary evidence for 
sex differences in interpretation biases in adolescence and support the hypothesis that 
social scenarios are a specific source of anxiety to this age group. A greater 
understanding of the etiology of interpretation biases will potentially enhance sex- and 
age-specific interventions for anxiety and mood disorders. 
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Introduction 
Women are almost twice as likely to suffer from an anxiety or mood disorder during 
their lifetimes than are men (Kessler et al., 2005), and, for several disorders, the sex 
difference in prevalence emerges at adolescence (e.g., depression: Hankin et al., 
1998; social phobia: Costello et al., 2003). A negative cognitive style has been 
hypothesised to be one of several factors that place adolescent females at greater risk 
than same-aged males of developing clinical anxiety or mood disorders (Hankin and 
Abramson, 2001; Hyde et al., 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema and Girgus, 1994). However, 
while adolescent girls are predicted to exhibit stronger negative cognitive biases than 
same-aged boys in non-clinical samples, relatively few studies have examined this 
hypothesis (e.g., Bell-Dolan, 1995; van Beek and Debus, 2008). Here, we investigated 
whether adolescents exhibit sex differences in interpretation bias, defined as the 
tendency to attribute positive or negative interpretations to ambiguous information 
(Blanchette and Richards, 2010).  
We used the Adolescent Interpretation and Belief Questionnaire (AIBQ; Miers et 
al., 2008), which presents written scenarios and asks whether specific negative, 
positive and neutral interpretations come to mind. As the questionnaire presents both 
positive and negative interpretations, researchers can examine whether some groups 
of individuals are more negative, and less positive, in their interpretations than other 
groups, or whether groups differ along just one of these valence dimensions. We 
predicted that adolescent girls would exhibit higher negative interpretation scores, 
and/or lower positive interpretation scores, when presented with ambiguous scenarios 
than same-aged boys. The questionnaire also asks participants to state which of the 
interpretations they found most believable; thus, we were able to compare whether 
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any sex differences in interpretation bias were mirrored by sex differences in belief 
scores. 
As the AIBQ contains an equal number of social and non-social scenarios, we 
were also able to examine whether sex differences in interpretation and belief scores 
varied depending upon the content of the scenario. In adulthood, the content of 
interpretation biases is sometimes specific to a particular sub-disorder; for example, 
adults with social phobia exhibit negative interpretation biases when evaluating social, 
but not non-social, information (e.g. Stopa and Clark, 2000). In contrast, relatively little 
is known about the content specificity of cognitive biases in adolescents (Muris and 
Field, 2008). We predicted that negative interpretation scores would be higher, and 
negative interpretations would be more believable, for social than for non-social 
scenarios, as social issues are a major source of anxiety in this age group (Gullone 
and King, 1993). We also predicted that girls’ responses would be particularly biased 
towards negative, or away from positive, interpretations for social scenarios, as 
adolescent girls’ self-worth is strongly related to positive social evaluation (e.g., 
O’Brien and Bierman, 1988). 
In summary, we examined whether adolescent girls and boys differ in 
interpretation bias and belief scores, and whether any sex differences in these biases 
vary depending upon the scenario content. Given that individuals with anxiety or mood 
disorders are known to interpret ambiguous scenarios more negatively than other 
individuals (Blanchette and Richards, 2010; Mathews and MacLeod, 2005), we also 
needed to test whether sex differences in cognitive biases are instead explained by 
sex differences in current symptoms of mood disorders. Therefore, we included a 
measure of depressive symptomology as a co-variate in the analyses of sex 
differences in interpretation bias scores and belief scores. 
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Methods 
Participants and procedure 
The participants were 31 girls (13.6 ± 0.1 years; range = 12.0 – 15.2 years) and 36 
boys (13.4 ± 0.2 years; range = 11.3 – 15.5 years), recruited from the local population 
(U.K.) through advertisements in local newspapers and newsletters, and posters at 
family-oriented venues. The primary language of all participants was English. Ethical 
clearance was provided by the School of Psychology and Neuroscience Ethics 
Committee. Each participant was tested individually and completed the Adolescents’ 
Interpretation and Belief Questionnaire, followed by the Revised Child Anxiety and 
Depression Scale. Receptive vocabulary age of participants was confirmed as being 
within the normal range for this age group using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, & Whetton, 1997). BPVS scores did not differ between the sexes 
(males = 14.8 ± 0.4 years, females = 14.5 ± 0.4 years: t-test, t65 = 0.6, n.s.). 
 
Measures 
Adolescents’ Interpretation and Belief Questionnaire (AIBQ; Miers et al., 2008)  This 
questionnaire assesses interpretation bias in adolescents and presents ten scenarios 
for the participants to imagine themselves in, with half involving social interactions and 
half involving non-social scenarios. An example of a social scenario is: ‘Two 
classmates, who are standing talking to each other, look at you. Why are they looking 
at you?’ The participant is then provided with three possible responses: one positive 
(‘They like me and want me to go over and join them’), one negative (‘They’re 
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gossiping about me’) and one neutral (‘They just happen to be looking in my direction’). 
An example of a non-social scenario is that a person has left his/her bike somewhere 
and cannot find it on returning to the location, where the possible responses are 
positive (‘I’m looking in the wrong place but it’s definitely around here’), negative (‘It’s 
been stolen’) or neutral (‘There are just so many bikes that it’s difficult to find it’). 
For each scenario, the participant rated the anticipated likelihood of each 
explanation coming to mind if he/she was in that situation (five-point Likert scale with 
three anchor points; 1 = ‘doesn’t pop up in my mind’, 3 = ‘might pop up in my mind’, 5 
= ‘definitely pops up in my mind’) and which one of the three explanations the 
participant found to be the most believable. Neutral explanations were not included in 
the analyses to allow direct comparison with the study by Miers and colleagues (2008). 
The mean rating of positive/negative/neutral explanation coming to mind (range = 1-5) 
and mean belief rating (positive explanation = 1, neutral explanation = 2, negative 
explanation = 3) were calculated separately for the social and non-social scenarios. 
 
Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scale (RCADS; Chorpita et al., 2000)  The 
RCADS is a self-reported measure of anxiety and depressive symptoms for children 
and adolescents. The questionnaire has 47 items that require the participant to state 
how often the item (e.g., ‘I get scared when I have to take a test’) applies to him/her 
(four-point Likert scale; 0 = never, 1 = sometimes, 2 = often, 3 = always). The items 
cover social phobia, major depressive disorder, and a range of anxiety disorders; data 
from the depression subscale were used as a covariate in our analyses. The scale’s 
internal consistency, reliability and validity are good (Chorpita et al., 2000), and 
Cronbach’s alpha scores are high (Chorpita et al., 2000). 
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Results 
 
AIBQ negative and positive interpretation scores 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with valence (negative/positive) 
and scenario type (social/non-social) as within-subjects variables and sex as a 
between-subject variable, revealed a significant interaction between valence 
(negative/positive) and sex (F1,65 = 4.36, p = .041, partial-eta squared ηp
2 = .063; 
Figure 1). This significant interaction was due to girls being more likely than boys to 
bring negative interpretations to mind (simple effects post-hoc tests, p <. 05). Boys 
were also more likely to bring positive interpretations to mind than negative 
interpretations (p < .01), while positive interpretation scores did not differ between girls 
and boys (n.s.). When depressive score was included as a co-variate in the ANOVA, 
the interaction between sex and valence was reduced to a trend (F1,64 = 3.10, p = .083, 
ηp
2 = .046).  
The interaction between scenario type and sex was not significant (F1,65 = .29, p 
= .594, ηp
2 = .004), nor was the three-way interaction between valence, scenario type 
and sex (F1,65 = .21, p = .651, ηp
2 = .003). Thus, the sex difference in negative 
interpretation bias did not depend upon the scenario content. However, there was a 
significant interaction between scenario type and valence (F1,65 = 48.30, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.426; Figure 2). Positive interpretations were more likely to come to mind in non-social 
scenarios than in social scenarios for both sexes (p < .001). Positive interpretations 
were also more likely to come to mind than negative interpretations in non-social 
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scenarios for both sexes (p < .001). No other pairwise comparisons were significant. 
The interaction between scenario type and valence remained significant when 
depressive score was included as a co-variate (F1,64 = 4.91, p = .030, ηp
2 = .071).  
 
AIBQ mean belief rating  
There was no main effect of sex on the belief rating (means and SEMs for females: 0.9 
± .04; males: 0.8 ± .05; ANOVA, F1,65 = 1.82, p = .182, ηp
2 = .027), and the interaction 
between scenario type and sex was also non-significant (F1,65 = .005, p = .946, ηp
2 < 
.001). Thus, despite the sex differences in negative interpretation scores, both girls 
and boys rated the believability of the interpretations similarly. However, mean belief 
ratings did differ between scenario types, with belief ratings being significantly higher, 
i.e. more negative, for social scenario than non-social scenarios (social scenarios: 1.1 
± .04; non-social scenarios: 0.7 ± .04; F1,65 = 69.41, p < .001, ηp
2 = .516). The main 
effect of scenario type remained significant when depressive score was included as a 
co-variate (F1,65 = 21.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = .249).  
 
Discussion  
Our results showed that adolescent girls are more likely to bring negative 
interpretations to mind than same-aged boys when presented with ambiguous 
scenarios. These data support previous studies that have reported sex differences in 
negative cognitive bias in adolescents. Adolescent girls have been found to attribute 
more negative emotions to ambiguous facial expressions (van Beek and Dubas, 
2008), attend more to threatening and neutral words (Vasey et al., 1996), and interpret 
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peer interactions more negatively than same-aged boys (Bell-Dolan, 1995). Our 
analyses also showed that including a depressive measure reduced the sex 
differences in negative interpretation scores, leaving open the possibility that sex 
differences in negative interpretation are partly explained by current mood 
symptomology. Despite higher negative interpretation scores across scenarios, 
adolescent girls did not find negative interpretations to be more believable than did 
boys, suggesting a dissociation between interpretation of scenarios and judgement of 
outcome likelihood. 
Our results also showed that the sex difference in interpretation bias results 
from a negative bias in girls, rather than a lack of positive bias. In contrast, Miers and 
colleagues (2008) reported that adolescent girls are both more negative, and less 
positive, than same-aged boys. However, Miers and colleagues’ (2008) only included 
individuals with high or average social anxiety scores, potentially leading to the 
exclusion of low anxiety girls who would be predicted to score high on both negative 
and positive interpretations. As the sex difference in negative interpretation scores did 
not vary across scenario type, adolescent girls appear to attribute more negative 
interpretations to ambiguous scenarios than boys, regardless of content. Thus, the 
data did not uphold our prediction that girls’ responses would be more strongly 
negative than boys’ responses for social, than non-social, scenarios.  
Interpretation biases differed according to the content of the ambiguous 
information across both sexes, with social scenarios being interpreted less positively 
than non-social scenarios. Adolescents also found negative interpretations to be more 
believable for social than for non-social scenarios. The finding that both interpretation 
and belief scores exhibit content specificity in an adolescent population is consistent 
with other evidence that social issues, such as peer evaluation, are a key source of 
10 
 
concern in this age group (Westenberg et al., 2007). Future studies could investigate 
whether sex differences in interpretation bias are also present in younger populations, 
in order to shed light on whether sex differences in interpretation bias precede the 
emergence of sex differences in anxiety and mood disorders. If interpretation biases 
are found to play a role in enhancing the vulnerability of adolescents to anxiety and 
mood disorders, a greater understanding the etiology of such biases, including the 
emergence of content specificity, could improve sex- and age-specific interventions 
and treatments (Rapee et al., 2009; Sauter et al., 2009).  
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1 Mean rating for negative and positive explanations coming to mind for boys 
and girls in the AIBQ (means ± SEMs). * indicates p≤ .05 in post-hoc tests. 
 
Figure 2 Mean rating of negative and positive explanations coming to mind in the 
social and non-social scenarios of the AIBQ (means ± SEMs). ** indicates p≤ .001 in 
post-hoc tests. 
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